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The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property 
Rights, and Time 
J. Peter Byrne∗ 
Global climate change has and will lead to substantial rises in 
global sea levels. The now inevitable rise in sea levels poses new 
and difficult challenges to property rights and land-use regulation. 
Inundation and storm surges will physically destroy private and 
public property at great loss. But perhaps more fundamentally, the 
threats of such losses and the predictable efforts to contain them 
will call for new approaches to land-use regulation and strain 
traditional understandings of property rights in land. Neither the 
common law nor traditional notions of zoning contain legal 
resources adequate to cope with the economic, environmental, and 
human risks that sea-level rise will generate. New forms of 
regulation and shifts in the content of common law rules will 
generate novel claims of regulatory takings, confronting courts 
with puzzling questions of fundamental rights under unprecedented 
climatic conditions.  
This Article seeks to clarify the kinds of regulatory takings 
questions that sea-level rise will generate, building on the 
emerging legal literature concerning adaptation to climate change. 
The Article unequivocally accepts the strong scientific consensus 
that global climate change is caused by human activity emitting 
greenhouse gases.1 Prompt and far-reaching legal and cultural 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2012, by J. PETER BYRNE. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author 
wishes to thank Daniel Ashby for helpful research assistance. Profound thanks 
also to Jessica Grannis for mentoring and for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. All errors are the author’s.   
The title of this Article invokes the seminal article on the nature of property 
rights, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
The point only is to suggest how sea-level rise, and changes in the natural world 
more generally, may upend some settled and static notions about the “cathedral” 
of property law, something Calabresi and Melamed probably would not disagree 
with. The title also borrows from Claude Debussy’s innovative prelude for 
piano, La cathédrale engloutie.   
 1. See, e.g., Richard A. Muller, The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 
30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
William D. Nordhaus, Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/ 
why-global-warming-skeptics-are-wrong.  
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reforms are needed to reduce global emissions.2 However, 
questions of legal adaptation to global warming and other 
observable climate phenomena do not require adherence to any 
explanation for climate change, so long as the reader accepts the 
observable fact that seas are rising. Adaptation measures do not 
seek to mitigate or stop climate change but rather seek to change 
legal regimes to cope with its physical consequences.3 Failure to 
adapt will put at hazard life, property, and vital ecological services. 
Even jurisdictions politically deadlocked over proposals to reduce 
greenhouse gases may accept the necessity for legal change to 
adapt to climate change. Of course, from the perspective of those 
who accept the scientific consensus about anthropogenic climate 
change,4 political paralysis over mitigation increases the urgency 
for adaptation measures. Because of the greenhouse gases’ 
durability in the atmosphere, serious warming will occur for many 
years even if humans presently find the capacity to dramatically 
reduce emissions.  
The consequences that climate change has for natural resources 
upon which humans depend are impressive and varied. Increased 
heat, habitat modification, species extinctions, drought, extreme 
storms, and flooding pose large public health and resource 
management challenges, some of which have received extensive 
analysis in the legal literature.5 Given the ecological importance of 
coastal areas and clustering of development within them, sea-level 
rise presents problems of great practical concern and compelling 
                                                                                                             
 2. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate 
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1153 (2009).  
 3. On the emerging law of adaptation, see THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (Michael B. Gerrard & 
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). For a comprehensive review of adaptation 
initiatives in the United States, see GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., ADAPTATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/clearinghouse 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 4. Anthropogenic means that human activity is a significant cause of climate 
change.  
 5. See, e,g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: 
Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Robin 
Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Climate 
Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 709, 724 (2010) (noting the high costs that will result from a water 
shortage due to climate change); Jessica Grannis, Julia Wyman, Meagan Singer, 
Jena Shoaf & Colin Lynch, Coastal Management in the Face of Rising Seas: 
Legal Strategies for Connecticut, 5 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 59 (2012) 
(detailing local and state policy approaches to mitigate the impacts of sea-level 
rise); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic 
Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269 (2012). 
2012] THE CATHEDRAL ENGULFED 71 
 
 
 
theoretical depth. Some islands, such as Maryland’s Smith Island 
in the Chesapeake Bay, which has been settled since 1686, will 
surely disappear.6 As has often been remarked, property and 
environmental conflicts are most acute where land meets the sea.7 
Not only do coastal areas present acute conflicts about balancing 
development and environmental protection, but the property rules 
and regulatory regimes regarding water and land differ markedly 
even though these natural elements are constantly interacting.8 
Judicial reports and law reviews are strewn with analyses of bitter 
disputes between collective action and individual interests in 
coastal regions.9 Sea-level rise adds a vigorous catalyst to this 
already bubbling brew.  
This Article focuses on regulatory takings law for its 
consideration of adaptation to sea-level rise. It does so even though 
regulatory initiatives for adapting to sea-level rise are in their 
infancy. Thus, the Article addresses general, proposed approaches 
to land-use regulation under discussion, rather than concrete 
regulatory initiatives under active conflict.10 This approach may 
seem to put the cart before the horse; however, discussion of 
regulatory takings problems posed by regulatory adaptation to sea-
level rise is already occurring and is an appropriate topic of this 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Ben Giles, Scientists Warn of Smith Island’s Demise, Residents Are 
Skeptical, THE BAY BEAT (Apr. 20, 2010), http://chesapeakebay.umd.edu/ 
article/scientists-warn-smith-islands-demise-residents-are-skeptical.  
 7. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and 
Sovereignty in Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647 (1986) (noting the public trust doctrine’s historic 
focus on navigable waters). 
 8. Residents of low-lying, economically disadvantaged countries are likely 
to suffer far more grievous harm than will residents of the United States. 
Although legal adaptation measures in such areas are beyond the domestic focus 
of this Article, vulnerable residents of places like Bangladesh deserve the 
world’s attention.  
 9. See generally Whaler’s Vill. Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 220 Cal. 
Rptr. 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concerning the right to protect one’s property and 
the state’s right to limit coastal development); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (concerning a property owner’s right to 
protect his land being overridden by the public trust doctrine); Niki L. Pace, 
Wetlands or Seawalls? Adapting Shoreline Regulations to Sea Level Rise and 
Wetland Preservation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 327 
(2011) (examining the policy options available in the face of sea-level rise). 
 10. For greater discussion of land-use regulatory approaches, see J. Peter 
Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 267–306; JESSICA GRANNIS, ADAPTATION 
TOOL KIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE (2011), http://www.george 
townclimate.org/resources/adaptation-tool-kit-sea-level-rise-and-coastal-land-use.  
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Article for several reasons.11 First, regulatory takings concerns are 
already central to discussions about the type of regulatory 
approaches that may be taken to address sea-level rise. Property 
owners disadvantaged by legal changes are quick to claim takings, 
and regulators are generally deterred by anxiety about takings 
litigation and liability. Thus, greater clarity about constitutional 
limits can guide regulatory choices or answer critics. Second, 
consideration of some new regulatory approaches needed to cope 
with sea-level rise highlights some of the absurdities of much of 
the regulatory takings doctrine. Insofar as the Supreme Court’s 
conservative majority has pursued an ideal of essential, or natural, 
property rights unchangeable without compensation, the dynamic 
physical transformations promised by sea-level rise show the need 
for a more lenient and flexible constitutional approach recognizing 
that property rules do and must evolve in accord with social and 
ecological change.12  
A central theme in this Article is the conceptual challenge 
posed by the dimension of time. Legal change to address future 
problems is inherently problematic, particularly when it entails 
immediate costs. This has played out in spades in political battles 
over efforts to reduce greenhouse gases but is a familiar issue in 
environmental law generally. Although sea-level rise is already 
occurring and legal efforts to adapt to it have begun, it will have 
far greater impact in the future. While such future sea-level rise is 
a near certainty, its pace and dimension can only be estimated. 
Thus, regulators may need to act based upon scientific predictions 
before concrete harms galvanize public opinion.  
This Article also seeks to show that the futurity of harm creates 
opportunities for gradual and adaptive regulations, which can 
minimize harms and takings compensation requirements. A central 
thesis is that regulations adopted now, but having their principal 
regulatory effect only in the future upon the occurrence of some 
event, will create a dynamic legal response to increasing sea-level 
rise. Such dynamic regulations have the potential to provide 
                                                                                                             
 11. The pioneering work in the field is James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal 
Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without 
Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 (1998). More recent thoughtful 
articles include Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property 
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51 (2011); Pace, supra note 9; Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt 
Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access 
Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (2007). 
 12. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature, 
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 
(1993). 
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effective environmental and social protections, to minimize harm 
to property owners, to preserve the public fisc, and to shape legal 
expectations appropriately. The Article thus presents four 
suggestions for regulatory architecture that employ this temporal 
dimension in legal adaptation to sea-level rise.  
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I reviews the threat that 
sea-level rise poses to coastal resources. This involves both what 
can be said about how fast the seas will rise and what physical 
effects such rise will entail, as well as the economic and 
environmental consequences of such rise.  Part II describes the 
chief types of regulatory responses to sea-level rise that can be 
anticipated and also presents the distinctive regulatory takings 
issues that each type of regulatory response can be expected to 
generate. While an infinite number of adaptations are conceivable, 
legal adaptations fall into a few discernable categories, each of 
which generates different regulatory takings problems. How these 
regulatory takings issues are resolved may determine how much 
each regulatory approach can be successfully implemented to 
minimize overall environmental, economic, and social harm. This 
Article argues that the most fruitful environmental response to sea-
level rise is a retreat from the rising seas, i.e., development 
regulations that prevent most new construction and rebuilding in 
the zones most affected by sea-level rise. Retreat, however, also 
raises the most troubling takings issues. Thus, Part III of the 
Article presents possible approaches that conscientious regulators 
can take to encourage or mandate retreat while minimizing takings 
risks or liability. Each approach exploits the temporal dimension in 
sea-level rise—enacting legal changes now to facilitate more 
effective adaptation in the future as waters mount higher and storm 
surges come further inland.  
I. SEA-LEVEL RISE 
A. Rate and Projections  
Rising seas will inundate low-lying coastal lands and increase 
the magnitude and frequency of storms. These forces will also 
combine to increase the erosion of coastal land. Together with the 
related problem of coastal subsidence, these forces threaten to 
destroy both development and environmental resources.   
Sea levels are rising now at an accelerating rate and are 
projected to rise to levels that will inflict significant damage to 
human society. Over the past several years, the available data and 
modeling related to sea-level rise have significantly improved, 
allowing better predictions of ground conditions for the year 
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2100.13 The projected sea-level rise has the potential to impact 
infrastructure seriously and adversely and may do so in ways that 
are currently impossible to predict. Evidence supports the 
possibility of abrupt climate events that could drastically worsen 
predictions. Indeed, one of the most alarming aspects of climate 
change is that it may contribute, along with other human-caused 
stresses on ecological systems, to a planetary “state shift” or 
tipping point, which may lead to sudden and dramatic changes in 
natural functions.14  
Sea-level rise has been tracked since the late 1800s by tide-
level gauges, and since 1993 changes have been recorded with 
high precision from altimeter satellites.15 Consistent with the 
hypothesis of anthropogenic climate change, i.e., that human 
activity significantly contributes to it, the spread of 
industrialization and increasing emissions of greenhouse gases 
correlates with an accelerating increase in sea-level rise since this 
metric was first recorded. A recent study, for example, found an 
increasing rate of sea-level rise in recent years: from 1950 to 1993 
it averaged 1.7 mm/year, while in the period from 1993 to 2009 it 
averaged 3.3 mm/year.16 The increase can be traced primarily to 
the expansion of water as it warms and the melting of ice sheets. 
As global temperatures rise, the average ocean temperature also 
rises, and according to basic scientific principles, the volume of the 
heated water expands. This expansion has been estimated to 
account for approximately 30% of sea-level rise over the most 
recent period of measurements from 1993 to 2009.17 The melting 
of polar and glacial ice has accelerated in pace with the increase in 
global temperatures. From 1993 to 2009, polar and glacial ice 
melting is estimated to contribute approximately 30% to sea-level 
                                                                                                             
 13. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.global 
change.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf (aggregating data from a 
variety of scientific papers to arrive at more accurate predictions for sea-level 
rise). 
 14. See Anthony Barnosky et al., Approaching a State Shift in Earth’s 
Biosphere, 486 NATURE 52 (2012).  
 15. Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-level Rise and Its Impact on 
Coastal Zones, 328 SCI. MAG. 1517 (2010); John A. Church & Neil J. White, 
Sea-level Rise from the Late 19th to Early 21st Century, 32 SURV. GEOPHYSICS 
585 (2011) [hereinafter Late 19th to Early 21st]; John A. Church & Neil J. 
White, A 20th Century Acceleration in Global Sea-Level Rise, 33 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS L01602 (2006). 
 16. Late 19th to Early 21st, supra note 15; Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 
15, at 1517.  
 17. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 15, at 1517. 
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rise.18 By the year 2100, this melting is expected to accelerate and 
ultimately contribute to 60%.19  
Estimates of future sea-level rise depend on models projecting 
historic trends based on hypotheses about its causes. While sea-
level rise clearly is accelerating, the rate of its future increases 
must remain uncertain. Researchers have varied in their projections 
as to the amount of sea-level rise that will take place by 2100. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) foundational 
2007 report projected maximum sea-level rise of .59m. An 
aggregation of studies postdating the IPCC report indicates that the 
range for possible sea-level rise is much higher than .59m and by 
some estimates could reach close to 2m.20  
While sea-level rise will be a global phenomenon, localities 
around the world and in the U.S. are likely to experience more rise 
than others. California is projected to experience sea-level rise 
ranging from 1.02m to 1.46m. The Gulf Coast is expected to 
experience sea-level rise in the range of .8m to 1.4m, depending on 
the model used.21 A recent study of a sea-level rise “hotspot” in the 
Northeast, where rates well above global averages have been 
observed, suggests that complex changes in oceanic currents may 
lead to dramatically higher sea-level rise on that coastline.22 New 
York City estimates that with rapid ice melting, it could face sea-
level rise of more than seven meters.23 
The above estimates of sea-level rise generally assume normal 
or linear changes in natural functions. However, other unseen 
factors or catastrophic changes in natural systems could drastically 
accelerate sea-level rise. The largest unknown factor is the 
behavior of ice sheets. Should significant decreases in ice-sheet 
volume occur, sea-level rise could be measured in tens of feet 
rather than by fractions of feet.24 Another climatic change that 
could affect sea-level rise is the potential decrease in strength of 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1518. 
 20. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 25; Mark F. 
Meier et al., Glaciers Dominate Eustatic Sea-Level Rise in the 21st Century, 317 
SCI. MAG. 1064 (2007). 
 21. Joseph F. Donoghue, Sea Level History of the Northern Gulf of Mexico 
Coast and Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the Near Future, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE 
17, 27 (2011).  
 22. Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr., Kara S. Doran & Peter A. Howd, Hotspot of 
Accelerated Sea Level Rise on the Atlantic Coast of North America, NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE (June 24, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/ 
vaop/ncurrent/pdf/nclimate1597.pdf.  
 23. N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 53 
(2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf. 
 24. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13. 
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oceanic circulation in the North Atlantic. Circulation is predicted 
to decrease 25% to 30% in the upcoming century. Accordingly, sea 
levels are expected to rise due to a decrease in heat transfer. While 
these changes are ill understood and not well modeled, it is 
predicted that a complete collapse in circulation would result in at 
least a .76m increase in sea-level rise.25  
The above projections only incorporate an increase in water 
levels and do not incorporate the impact of land subsidence. 
Climate change will interact with and contribute to territorial 
subsidence, which will exacerbate the coastal land loss. Subsidence 
is a complex phenomenon to which human actions contribute. 
Engineering of rivers and reduced flows may decrease sediment 
deposition, while groundwater depletion may exacerbate natural 
subsidence. A recent study examined the impact of groundwater 
depletion, concluding that approximately 42% of sea-level change 
can be attributed to withdrawals of water from terrestrial aquifers, 
which cannot be naturally replenished at a pace equal to the 
withdrawal rate.26 Louisiana is a poster child for loss of coastal 
land due to combined subsidence and sea-level rise. Construction 
of flood-control levees and dredging of deep navigation channels 
have cut off flows of sediments from river to delta and have 
contributed to the loss of 1,900 square miles of Louisiana’s coastal 
wetlands during the past century.27 Louisiana continues to lose 25 
to 35 square miles of wetlands each year28 and is projected to lose 
up to 51 square miles of wetlands per year if significant corrective 
actions are not taken.29 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. Yadu N. Pokhrel et al., Model Estimates of Sea-Level Change Due to 
Anthropogenic Impacts on Terrestrial Water Storage, 5 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 
389 (2012). While this metric incorporates the mitigating effect of artificial 
sequestration (e.g., reservoirs), groundwater depletion has increased at a steady 
rate while reservoir impoundment of water has leveled off. Coastal cities such as 
Tokyo are already experiencing subsidence of up to 5 m. Nicholls & Cazenave, 
supra note 15, at 1518. 
 27. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 149.  
 28. Louisiana Begins Wetland Repair with Mississippi River Sediment, 
ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr 
2009/2009-04-14-093.asp. See also Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal 
Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1983). 
 29. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S 
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 87 (2012), 
available at http://www.lacpra.org/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final% 
20Plan/2012%20Coastal%20Master%20Plan.pdf.  
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B. Consequences 
The consequences of the projected sea-level rise can be 
grouped into three categories: environmental, social, and 
economic. Primarily environmental consequences consist in the 
loss of coastal islands, wetlands, and sand dunes to rising waters. 
These coastal lands provide essential habitat and ecological 
services such as water purification and storm protection.30 A 1m 
increase in sea level would inundate approximately 65% of U.S. 
coastal marshlands, an ecosystem home to numerous endangered 
species that also provides a protective barrier for inland areas from 
wave action and storms.31 Sea-level rise poses similar threats to the 
health of coral reefs.32 Increasingly large levels of saltwater 
intrusions into local aquifers can also be expected, contaminating 
the water supply for both humans and coastal flora–fauna 
dependent on freshwater.33  
Societal impacts of sea-level rise largely stem from much of 
the United States population living near the coast. The residences 
of approximately 3.7 million people would be inundated if sea 
levels were to rise by one meter.34 Nearly 23 million people live 
within six meters of the mean high tide line. If these people are not 
inundated during this century, they will be exposed to greater risk 
of flooding in storms.35 Sea water incursions and storm surges may 
salinate freshwater supplies, causing more dislocation.36 
                                                                                                             
 30. Ecological services are the benefits conferred on humans by the natural 
functioning of ecosystems and are often taken for granted because they need not 
be purchased in the market. See generally NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL 
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (G.R. Daily ed., 1997); James 
Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006). 
 31. Donoghue, supra note 21, at 27. More recent studies have been broadly 
consistent with figures from past reports, finding a 44% loss of wetlands by 
2080 from a 72 cm rise in sea level. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, 
COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-ATLANTIC 
REGION 64 (2009), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/ 
sap4-1/final-report/sap4-1-final-report-all.pdf. 
 32. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 182. 
 33. Id. at 21.  
 34. Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Tidally Adjusted Estimates of Topographic 
Vulnerability to Sea Level Rise and Flooding for the Contiguous United States, 
7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (2012), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014 
033/pdf/1748-9326_7_1_014033.pdf.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Grant Ferguson, Vulnerability of Coastal Aquifers to Groundwater Use 
and Climate Change, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 342 (2012). The 
combination of sea water incursions and reduced fresh water flows, due to 
drought, recently have required some communities in Louisiana to forgo use of 
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California’s Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta (with its 
network of rivers, levees, and dams), the center of the state’s water 
infrastructure, has been assessed as “unsustainable” by state 
authorities, given the projected increase in sea-level rise and 
decline in precipitation over the next century.37 Displacement of so 
many people, even if gradual, will be traumatic. Moreover, social 
conflict over managing such changes will become a persistent 
feature of local, state, and national political life. 
In addition to environmental and social impacts, sea-level rise 
will produce serious economic consequences. For example, the 
State of New York has approximately $2.3 trillion in insured 
coastal property.38 New York City alone has 33,000 buildings, 
worth $18.3 billion, in the historic 100-year flood zone.39 Norfolk, 
Virginia, a dynamic regional employment center, anticipates 
needing $1 billion over the next 30 years to construct floodgates 
and drains because of current and anticipated sea-level rise and 
land subsidence.40  
The economic impact of sea-level rise could wreak havoc on 
the country’s infrastructure and cripple the economy. For example, 
sea-level rise threatens six out of the country’s top ten freight 
gateways (measured by value of shipments).41 In the Gulf Coast 
                                                                                                             
 
their normal water supplies and purchase water from New Orleans, which itself 
is threatened with future salination. See Richard Rainey, Saltwater Wedge 
Reaches Chalmette: Plaquemines Buys N.O. Water, NOLA.COM (Aug. 15, 2012, 
6:56 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/08/saltwater_wedge_ 
reaches_chalme.html.   
 37. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., DELTA RISK MGMT. STRATEGY, FINAL 
PHASE 1 RISK REPORT: SECTION 14 (RISK ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE YEARS) 29 
(2009), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/floodsafe/fessro/levees/drms/docs/ 
Risk_Report_Section_14_Final.pdf. 
 38. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 109.  
 39. Jeroen C. J. H. Aerts & W. J. Wouter Botzen, Managing Exposure to 
Flooding in New York City, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 377 (2012). The 100-
year flood zone is an area which has a 1% chance of flooding in any one year. 
Robert R. Holmes, Jr. & Karen Dinicola, U.S. Geological Survey, 100-Year 
Flood—It’s All About Chance (2010), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106/ 
pdf/100-year-flood_041210web.pdf.  
 40. See Darryl Fears, Built on Sinking Ground, Norfolk Tries to Hold Back Tide 
amid Sea-Level Rise, WASH. POST (June 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/national/health-science/built-on-sinking-ground-norfolk-tries-to-hold-back-tide-
amid-sea-level-rise/2012/06/17/gJQADUsxjV_story.html. Norfolk’s planning 
comes against a state political background in which legislators refused to use the 
words “sea-level rise” or “climate change” in legislation authorizing a study of such 
phenomena. Id.  
 41. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 15, at 62. Of the county’s top ten 
freight gateways, the ports of JFK International Airport, Los Angeles, New 
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alone, thousands of miles of roadways and hundreds of freight 
railways are in jeopardy of being permanently flooded due to sea-
level rise.42 Aside from transportation infrastructure, a significant 
portion of the country’s energy infrastructure is positioned in 
coastal areas, and sea-level rise will result in direct losses from 
equipment damage and high relocation or armoring costs to protect 
these facilities. Tourism infrastructure will also be heavily 
damaged, resulting in local economic depressions for communities 
that depend heavily on the industry. Many beachfront homes will 
be inundated.43  
C. Property Rights and Sea-Level Rise 
Sea-level rise will change property boundaries. Unimpeded, 
rising sea levels will divest private property owners and shift 
ownership to the public as sea water slowly inundates formerly dry 
land. This is the background legal reality that shapes analysis of 
the property rights and takings implications of regulatory 
strategies.  
Under the law of every state, the land under the sea essentially 
belongs to the public.44 The public trust doctrine, with roots in 
Roman law and English common law, currently composed of both 
state and federal common law, as well as constitutional elements, 
provides for public rights over the bed and banks of navigable 
                                                                                                             
 
York, Long Beach, Los Angeles International Airport, and Houston are 
vulnerable to sea-level rise. 
 42. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 62. California’s 
transportation infrastructure is similarly at risk. MATTHEW HEBERGER ET AL., 
CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., THE IMPACTS OF SEA-LEVEL RISE ON THE 
CALIFORNIA COAST 54 (2009), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/ 
sea_level_rise/report.pdf.  
 43. Admittedly, some previously inland homes will acquire direct beach access, 
although of uncertain value. As Hurricane Katrina showed, the consequences of sea-
level rise are likely to have a disparate impact upon low-income communities that 
lack the resources to adapt, recover, or escape. The United States is less at risk than 
other countries because of its geography and wealth. In Bangladesh, many of its 158 
million impoverished citizens live within 20 feet of sea level; the government 
estimates that 20 million people will need to be resettled as soon as 2050. Dan 
Morrison, Come Hell with High Water, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012, 7:36 AM), http:// 
latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/bangladesh-faces-environmental-calamity-if-
carbon-emissions-arent-cut. The challenges of adaptation in the United States, 
though daunting, are quite manageable by comparison. 
 44. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
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waters and tidelands.45 These public rights include access for 
navigation, fishing, and often recreation, as well as for 
environmental protection.46 At the coast, the public’s rights 
generally extend up to the mean high-tide line.47 The public trust is 
broad and vague, but it provides the public with property rights 
superior to any private owner on the lands and waters to which it 
applies.48  
As rising seas move the line between public tidelands and 
private dry lands farther upland, private owners will lose land to 
the public as it becomes subject to tidal wash. This is the effect of 
the ancient doctrine of accretion, which provides that slow or 
imperceptible changes in physical boundaries set by water courses 
change legal ownership.49 A sudden, perceptible change in a water 
boundary, known as avulsion, does not change ownership, which 
remains at the line of the prior physical boundary.50 Sea-level rise 
is incremental, and therefore, corresponding land loss will be 
subject to the doctrine of accretion and will deprive private land 
owners of their property rights in the inundated lands.51 Thus, 
under existing law, sea-level rise, which generally proceeds slowly 
and incrementally, will deprive littoral owners of land ownership. 
Accretionary loss has never been considered a taking, 
constitutionally requiring public compensation, because nature, 
rather than the state, effects the deprivation. Loss of littoral land 
through accretion might be understood to be a risk that “inheres in 
the title” to such land.52  
                                                                                                             
 45. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: 
Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 
(2006).  
 46. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
 47. Pace, supra note 9. 
 48. See J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green 
Property, A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915 (2012).  
 49. See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its 
Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010).  
 50. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1892).  
 51. Coastline movement due to storms, even though sudden and, thus, 
avulsion, also moves property lines. As the Texas Supreme Court held that 
public easements cannot move inland due to avulsion, it affirmed that the line 
between public trust and private uplands did move due to the same events. 
Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]hile losing 
property to the public trust as it becomes part of the wet beach or submerged 
under the ocean is an ordinary hazard of ownership for coastal property owners, 
it is far less reasonable, and unsupported by ancient common law precepts, to 
hold that a public easement can suddenly encumber an entirely new portion of a 
landowner’s property or a different landowner’s property that was not 
previously subject to that right of use.”).   
 52. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
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That sea-level rise will, over time, deprive owners of their 
littoral property without compensation is an important background 
principle in assessing whether regulation of property use before the 
sea-level rise should be considered a taking. Owners have every 
incentive to block such loss by armoring their property with sea-
walls, but such structures will deprive the public of their right to 
new public trust lands and cause a variety of other harms. The 
prospect of uncompensated loss also changes what can be 
considered the “property as a whole” under the standard approach 
to identifying a regulatory taking. As the rate of sea-level rise 
becomes clearer and more broadly understood, it will affect littoral 
land’s market price, generally lowering it. Such land may become 
uninsurable. In assessing whether a regulation reduces the 
economic value of littoral land, the economic effects of the 
regulation must be distinguished from the economic effects of sea-
level rise itself.53   
Are the rules of accretion and avulsion subject to legislative 
change to perpetuate the ownership rights of upland property 
owners? State legislatures might provide through statute that 
upland owners retain ownership rights despite being submerged, 
abrogating the traditional understanding of accretion. To be sure, 
the accretion–avulsion rules may be criticized as excessively 
formalistic. They developed long ago under quite different 
economic and environmental conditions and before modern 
surveying methods.54 Coastal land in pre-modern times did not 
enjoy a premium because of leisure amenities. Most 
conspicuously, the doctrine of accretion seemed fair when it was 
assumed that waters could rise or fall in equal probability, so that a 
littoral owner could be advantaged at one time and disadvantaged 
at another.55 Climate-induced sea-level rise ensures that littoral 
owners will be net losers from accretion for the foreseeable future, 
undermining the justice of the rule. The accretion and avulsion 
doctrines seem to be merely common law solutions for the 
practical problem of ascertaining boundaries after physical change 
obliterates former boundaries.  These two concepts apparently 
enjoy no constitutional status that would immunize them from 
legislative reform.  
On the other hand, abrogating the rules of accretion for littoral 
owners would deprive the public of the traditional right of access 
                                                                                                             
 53. On the other hand, land saved from sea-level rise through public 
armoring may see a relative increase in market value, although this would be 
attributable to the public subsidizing of levees or other works. 
 54. Sax, supra note 49, at 320. 
 55. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.   
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to the shoreline provided under the public trust doctrine. Such a 
change would prospectively prevent the public from accessing 
tidelands or submerged lands even though those rights always have 
been tied to the physical condition of such water boundaries. 
Arguably, such tidelands are far better suited and more valuable 
for public access than for private ownership or use.56 Although the 
Takings Clause would not protect public land against a taking for 
private use, a provocative asymmetry, most states’ public trust 
doctrines have established limits against alienation of public trust 
lands not for public trust ends.57 Such a limitation could invalidate 
a rule aimed at preventing the expected increase of public trust 
lands through accretion, although that raises the long-standing 
ambiguity of whether the public trust doctrine is constitutional 
under a state’s law. In any event, the public may oppose such 
elimination of public rights.  
Also, the Supreme Court has given precedence to the doctrines 
of accretion and avulsion over statutory changes in the context of 
takings challenges. In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection, the Court upheld the 
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that Florida’s Beachfront 
Management Act did not change the rights of littoral owners 
because the statute duplicated the results that the doctrine of 
avulsion already provided.58 It is striking that the Court gave so 
much weight to this obscure common law principle rather than 
assessing the underlying statute’s inherent fairness or rationality. 
As I have written elsewhere, the turn to common law essentialism 
in regulatory takings doctrine threatens to perpetuate outdated rules 
and divert attention from whether statutes address new 
environmental challenges in accord with basic fairness.59 Thus, 
judicial conservatism probably will retain the accretion–avulsion 
distinction simply because it has endured for a long time.   
 
 
                                                                                                             
 56. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
 57. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding 
legislature’s conveyance away of public trust land beneath navigable waters 
ineffective).  
 58. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592 (2010). This decision is considered more fully below in the section 
addressing soft armoring of the coastline. 
 59. J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on 
Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 
625, 642 (2010). 
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D. Market Mechanisms; Flood Insurance 
This Article concentrates on land-use regulation and other 
forms of government mandates to adapt to sea-level rise, both 
because such regulation is indispensible for reasonable problems, 
and because it is a precondition for the Takings Clause analysis at 
its center. However, this Article does not purport to slight 
cooperative and market mechanisms, which can have great value in 
certain situations, at least when market incentives provide support 
to public-spirited motivation. Private owners may manage their 
land so as to protect environmental or other collective values. 
Private organizations, such as land trusts, or state and local 
governments, may purchase land or conservation easements to 
promote ecological services under new coastal conditions. Such 
activity has great value because it avoids coercion and can proceed 
in advance of the formation of political majorities responding to 
crisis. But such activity is generally incentivized by tax breaks and 
other public payments, which make such private actions more 
economically plausible. However, there will never be enough 
money to incentivize voluntary adaption on a scale necessary to 
cope with sea-level rise. Moreover, in some circumstances, basic 
social morality is undermined when payments are made to a 
landowner simply because that landowner has chosen not to 
engage in development that harms life or ecosystems.60  
Broad political support should exist for the abolition of public 
subsidies that exacerbate the risks of sea-level rise. Reform of the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), seems the most 
obvious and urgent legal step to adapt to sea-level rise.61 The NFIP 
was enacted because private insurers were fleeing the market due 
to catastrophic losses from storms and flooding. It provides federal 
insurance against such hazards at submarket rates in exchange for 
local adoption of building codes and land-use measures thought to 
lessen storm and flood risks. The NFIP has grown to a massive 
special interest that has promoted excessive land development of 
coastal areas by socializing the risks of private building by the sea. 
                                                                                                             
 60. See John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to 
Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES ENVTL. L. 1 (2005). 
 61. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS (2009), 
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc 
10620/11-04-floodinsurance.pdf; JUSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER 
INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING: THE CASE FOR RELYING ON THE 
PRIVATE MARKET (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1695697.  
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The local-government development restrictions required by the 
NFIP are inadequate even without the increased risks of climate 
change. Even more alarming, the flood maps used to assess risks 
do not in any way take into account the certainty of future sea-level 
rise. Federal law has required that flood maps be calculated only 
on historic flood experiences and does not permit FEMA to take 
into account scientific models predicting increased future flooding 
due to climate change and other factors.  
Congress very recently enacted legislation reforming some 
aspects of NFIP.62 The statute directs FEMA to revise flood maps 
based upon “future changes in sea levels, precipitation, and 
intensity of hurricanes”63 and to develop recommendations about 
how to incorporate climate change into regulatory maps.64 It may 
not grant FEMA the authority to actually affect development 
decisions, such as adjusting flood insurance premiums based upon 
the increased risk due to sea-level rise.65 Nonetheless, the Act does 
allow FEMA to develop more realistic flood maps, which local 
governments can use in crafting land-use regulations. Also, the Act 
phases out insurance subsidies for new homes, second homes, and 
properties subject to repetitive loss, and allows FEMA to raise 
premiums across the board to higher (but still capped) 
maximums.66 The Act, while imperfect to be sure, demonstrates 
the capacity for Congress to enact legislation to eliminate subsidies 
for nonsensical behavior in light of sea-level rise. It was a small 
price to pay for constructive legislation that all references to 
climate change were eliminated from the Act’s language in the 
final conference.67  
Reforming flood insurance shows how market incentives can 
promote land use adaptation to sea-level rise without incurring 
taking problems. Eliminating insurance subsidies requires coastal 
residents to bear more of the real costs of doing so. Such costs 
                                                                                                             
 62. Biggert–Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, 126 Stat. 405 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001–4129). See also 
Jessica Grannis, Analysis of How the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (H.R. 
4348) May Affect State and Local Adaptation Efforts, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE 
CTR. (2012), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/Analysis%20 
of%20the%20Flood%20Insurance%20Reform%20Act%20of%202012.pdf.  
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 100216(b)(3)(D) (2012).  
 64. Id. § 100216. 
 65. See id. § 100211 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4015). FEMA may still only 
establish insurance premiums based upon consideration of the “average 
historical loss year.” Id. 
 66. Id. § 100205 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014 & 4015(e)).  
 67. See Evan Lehmann, ‘Global Warming’ Disappears from Flood 
Legislation, CLIMATEWIRE (July 3, 2012), available at http://rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/flood-climate.pdf.  
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should encourage retreat from rising seas and the choice to live 
further inland.  
II. ADAPTATION TO SEA-LEVEL RISE AND REGULATORY TAKINGS  
This Part of the Article seeks to identify the takings issues 
raised by each type of regulatory response to sea-level rise. There 
are three possible regulatory responses to sea-level rise: defense, 
retreat, or accommodation. The first two already have and will 
continue to present significant regulatory takings issues. The third, 
accommodation, refers to building codes that require structures to 
be raised or reinforced to withstand floodwaters.68 Such building 
codes frequently reside in local regulations designed to meet the 
NFIP’s requirements. These requirements have not given rise to 
takings claims and, as safety rules that expressly permit 
development, are unlikely to do so.  
Defense and retreat measures both engage property rights and 
present challenging, if different, regulatory takings issues. This 
Part will explain the purposes of and mechanisms for defense and 
retreat measures and then explicate the takings issues that each 
generates. Neither is different from regulatory steps taken in the 
past to address flooding or erosion, but the scale and ubiquity of 
sea-level rise will require their deployment to a degree that should 
stimulate fresh thinking about both regulatory design and the 
nature of constitutional protection for private property. Part III of 
this Article will propose time-triggered approaches to retreat 
regulations that seek a new balance between collective protections 
and private rights.  
Before considering the variety of regulatory responses to sea-
level rise, a brief general introduction to the Takings Clause may 
be helpful. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”69 It was intended to condition the 
exercise of eminent domain on compensation.70 Understandably, it 
was extended to require compensation when the government 
otherwise physically takes possession of property without the 
formalities of condemnation71 and was applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.72 In modern times, courts 
                                                                                                             
 68. GRANNIS, supra note 10, at 23. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 70. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Meaning of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
 71. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
 72. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226 (1897). 
86 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
have established that regulation of property use, without any 
dispossession, can amount to a taking if the economic 
consequences to the owner are severe enough.73 This regulatory 
takings doctrine provides far and away the most significant 
constitutional limitation on state and local land-use regulatory 
authority.  
The Supreme Court’s 1978 Penn Central decision canonized 
an ad hoc, fact-sensitive approach to determining whether a 
regulation effects a regulatory taking.74 The Court upheld New 
York City’s historic preservation law, which prohibited the owner 
from adding a massive modernist tower above iconic Grand 
Central Station. The opinion balanced the economic injury to the 
owner, especially the degree to which the regulation frustrated its 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, with the character and 
purpose of the government’s actions. Subsequently, the Court 
established two circumstances in which a regulation can effect a 
taking per se, that is, without any balancing of competing factors: 
when a regulation authorizes a permanent physical invasion75 and 
when it deprives the owner of all economic value.76 Critics argue 
that the regulatory takings doctrine lacks persuasive basis in the 
Constitution’s language, history, or early interpretation.77 
Nonetheless, property rights advocates and several sympathetic 
Supreme Court Justices have striven to expand the doctrine’s reach 
and strength to become a primary substantive limitation on 
government power over private property.78 All of this is relevant to 
understanding how the judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause 
may shape legal adaptation to sea-level rise.    
A. Hard Armoring 
The prospect of fighting back against sea-level rise may invoke 
images of ancient King Canute ordering back the sea, a persistent 
icon of human and governmental futility.79 Yet there have been 
                                                                                                             
 73. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
 74. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
 77. See generally, e.g., Byrne, supra note 48; Treanor, supra note 70; Sax, 
supra note 49; Lazarus, supra note 2; Echeverria, supra note 60. 
 78. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that any net diminution in value 
requires compensation); James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the 
Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2002).  
 79. Contrary to how the Canute story is usually interpreted, the King may 
have intended to convey to his followers the limits of governmental power. See 
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notable successes in building structures to protect or reclaim dry 
land from the sea and from flood waters. Building structures to 
hold back the sea generally is referred to as armoring. Such 
structures can consist of construction materials, such as steel and 
concrete used in levees and bulkheads, which are referred to as 
hard armoring. They may also employ natural and living materials 
to build or restore beaches, sand dunes, or wetlands, in which case 
they are referred to as soft armoring.80  
Both forms of armoring interpose higher elements to shield dry 
land from sea water, and both involve significant expense in 
engineering, constructing, and maintaining structures that can 
withstand the pressures of nature. Plainly, armoring the entire coast 
will never be economically feasible or even rational.81 Levees will 
certainly protect areas of intense development, like Manhattan, and 
beaches valuable for recreation and tourism will be restored. 
Armoring most of the shoreline, however, cannot be justified. 
Moreover, armoring causes significant environmental harms. Hard 
armoring will eliminate the intertidal area as seas rise, and it often 
increases erosion of neighboring properties by increasing current 
and wave action laterally against unprotected shorelines. Soft 
armoring causes less environmental harm because it mimics 
natural shorelines, but its capacity to preserve ecological services 
performed by natural shorelines has not been clearly established.82 
Each method of armoring performs differently under different 
environmental conditions. While each raises takings problems, the 
issues that they raise seem quite different. 
Hard armoring can be accomplished by either private or public 
action. Private property owners can construct bulkheads on the 
seaward boundaries to reclaim land or to shield development from 
sea water. Private armoring in itself does not threaten any taking 
because it lacks state action. It does, however, threaten tort liability 
because the construction of a levee on one property may damage 
neighboring land by redirecting or intensifying wave or current 
action, thereby increasing erosion.83 Historically, most states have 
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 80. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in 
THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 235–65. 
 81. See Byrne & Grannis, supra note 10. 
 82. See Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 80. 
 83. See Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use Has Become the Common 
Enemy: An Overview of the Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Water and 
the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1, 9–12 
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held armoring owners free from liability to their eroding or flooded 
neighbors under what has been termed the common enemy rule for 
repelling floodwaters.84 In short, the rule provides that every 
property owner can take whatever actions on his own land that he 
wishes without incurring liability to neighboring owners from 
causing increased flooding or other harms. Many states have taken 
the more modern approach of imposing a reasonableness standard 
on such self-protection.85 The serious taking issue that relates to 
private armoring stems from regulations prohibiting such armoring 
as a means of encouraging retreat from rising waters. That issue 
will be addressed below in Part II.C. 
Government-built or -authorized levees raise a variety of 
takings issues.86 Some may be straightforward, such as the 
expropriation of land for construction of public levees, but even 
here the existence of some kinds of public easements may shield 
the government from liability.87 The more interesting issues stem 
from flooding caused by government action. Government- 
authorized construction that causes a permanent flooding has long 
been viewed as a taking.88  
Such issues have often arisen under the federal flood-control 
programs. The Flood Control Act of 1928,89 under which the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers has built and manages the levee system 
                                                                                                             
 
reasonable use doctrine regarding a property owner’s right to combat surface 
waters, with another significant minority following a modified rule allowing a 
finding of liability due to negligence or trespass). 
 84. See id. at 13.  
 85. It may also be that state or local permitting of armoring may violate 
state public trust doctrines, because it would in some instances diminish public 
trust coastal resources. Cf. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono 
Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (suggesting that state recognition of water 
rights may violate public trust doctrine), cert. denied sub nom. L.A. Dep't of 
Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). I am indebted to 
Jessica Grannis for this suggestion.  
 86. There does seem also to be an argument that publically constructed hard 
armoring may violate the public trust doctrine when it causes the destruction of 
public trust tidelands through erosion. Such construction essentially transfers 
property rights from the public to adjacent private owners without furthering 
public trust values; indeed, they eliminate opportunities for public access over 
the tidelands and undermine the environmental services that tidelands provide.  
 87. See Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896) (finding that Louisiana 
levee easement shields from Fifth Amendment compensation requirement 
expropriation of land to erect a levee).  
 88. See e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872) (noting that 
permanent government-authorized flooding would be considered a taking per 
se); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).  
 89. 33 U.S.C §§ 701–709b (2006).  
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on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, provides the United 
States with immunity for tort liability for flooding resulting from 
operation of the system.90 Litigants continue to test the limits of 
that immunity.91 Of course, no statutory immunity can shield the 
government from constitutional takings liability, so litigants seek 
to characterize flooding losses attributable to government 
management of the federal system as takings. This has led to stress 
on the line between tort and takings. While negligent or 
inadvertent government flooding of private property cannot readily 
be characterized as a taking, a variety of deliberate or foreseeable 
flooding may be, although such claims face a host of formal or 
conceptual barriers.92  
The complexities of and potential for such flooding–takings 
claims can be seen in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, a 
recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims.93 Plaintiffs owned 
land in the Birds Point–New Madrid Floodway in Missouri that 
was deliberately flooded by the Corps, according to the established 
plan for flood control, by breaching a levee to relieve flood risk to 
the upstream city of Cairo, Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that the 
consequent flooding destroyed crops, equipment, and 
infrastructure, and also deposited substantial quantities of sand and 
gravel that impair farming and cause recurring flooding from rain. 
Although the United States had acquired flood easements in the 
past from some landowners, the plaintiffs alleged that the flooding 
here exceeded what had been provided for in the easements. In a 
careful opinion, Judge Firestone applied existing precedent to 
dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the flooding did 
not amount to taking because, even accepting that it reflected 
deliberate government policy, it was based on a single flooding 
incident. The court followed precedent providing that flooding 
attributable to the government amounts to taking only if it is both 
intentional and either permanent or “intermittent but inevitably 
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recurring.”94 Plaintiffs argued that the flooding they suffered was 
inevitably recurring because the Corps’s operation plan for the 
river directed it to breach the levee and flood Birds Point whenever 
river conditions met established standards. The court rejected this 
argument based upon another precedent providing that planned 
flooding can be a taking only if plaintiffs can show that it caused 
more frequent flooding than would have occurred in the plan’s 
absence.95 As the Supreme Court stated long ago, “The 
Government has not subjected respondent’s land to any additional 
flooding, above what would occur if the Government had not 
acted; and the Fifth Amendment does not make the Government an 
insurer that the evil of floods be stamped out universally before the 
evil can be attacked at all.”96 Allegations that the plan created more 
damaging—though not more frequent—flooding did not suffice.97 
Big Oak Farms demonstrates the formidable doctrinal defenses 
that courts have provided the United States against flooding-related 
takings claims based upon flood-control efforts. The Supreme 
Court has not seriously considered flooding takings in many 
decades. In that time, general takings law has developed 
substantially, with a conservative plurality eager to establish 
greater constitutional protections for private property.98 The Court 
has now granted certiorari in a flooding case, Arkansas Game and 
Fish Commission v. United States, in which the Federal Circuit 
found no taking because flooding was considered temporary when 
Corps officials temporarily flooded a state forest during growing 
season for six consecutive years.99 Given the Court’s enhanced 
interest in so-called temporary takings over the past two decades, 
there is a substantial chance that the Court will expand takings 
liability for flooding.100 Although prior cases seem to have 
established a per se rule that temporary, nonrecurring floods cannot 
be takings, it would be surprising if the Court should adhere to that 
perspective. The Government may be satisfied if the Court holds 
only that temporary flooding should be evaluated under the fact-
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sensitive Penn Central test, rather than treating intentional or 
foreseeable flooding as a physical occupation amounting to a per 
se taking.101 The argument seems strong because a per se taking 
rule threatens to erode the distinction between takings and torts. 
Because some of the Justices desire to extend constitutional 
protections for private property, this case will likely mandate more 
frequent government liability for intentional flooding.  
What does that indicate about takings liability for government 
armoring of the coast? The current round of river flooding cases 
may well provide the normative context within which government 
management of seawalls to hold back rising seas will be viewed. 
Government will be unable to erect levees everywhere rising seas 
should threaten land. Choices will need to be made based on 
feasibility, cost, and environmental consequences. Losers are likely 
to argue that deliberate choices not to protect their property should 
entitle them to compensation in a manner analogous to property 
owners whose lands are flooded when seawalls to protect others 
are erected or destroyed. Government cannot take property purely 
by inaction. But extensive plans for seawalls that exclude certain 
private parcels may be viewed by courts as a more active decision 
to flood those parcels, especially if the armoring increased the 
magnitude of the flood risk to intentionally unprotected land. Also, 
more severe storms assaulting seawalls and levees will likely result 
in more occasions in which the government must decide whether to 
breach works and flood one area to protect another. Floods that 
would be attributed to nature against a background of government 
inaction may be charged against government when it acts to 
manage them.102 The distracting issue of temporary flooding may 
play a smaller role in sea-level rise flooding disputes because sea-
level rise inundation will be permanent in the legal sense (although 
stronger storm surges reaching farther inland will still present 
temporary flooding puzzles).  
Property rights advocates can place government decisions to 
permit flooding of specific private land into the traditional 
narrative of takings cases. Once government assumes from Nature 
the authority to decide who shall be flooded and who shall be 
defended, flooded property owners will claim a right to 
compensation. These property owners will invoke maxims 
stressing that landowners whose lands are sacrificed for the general 
good are bearing “public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
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should be borne by the public as a whole.”103 Moreover, the 
government’s discretion to choose whom and where to flood may 
raise the same concerns about the political influence of the wealthy 
and powerful that have animated opposition to eminent domain. In 
short, sea-level rise may make government decisions about 
whether to armor someone’s property subject to takings claims to a 
degree similar to what the U.S. Supreme Court may prescribe for 
deliberate decisions to flood some land to protect or benefit other 
land. Such an approach could seriously deter decisions to retreat in 
the face of sea-level rise rather than to build levees because the 
government would need to compensate owners for the permitted 
inundation of their land.   
 Several powerful doctrines stand in the way of this dangerous 
path. The Court has squarely ruled that government-caused 
flooding does not give rise to a taking if the subject land would 
have flooded under natural conditions.104 This rule would surely 
protect government decisions not to armor shorelines, but it arose 
at a time of greater judicial confidence in the benefits of 
government management of resources. How it fares in upcoming 
rounds of flooding litigation remains to be seen.  
At bottom, government liability to property owners for 
flooding from management of government water-control facilities 
raises fundamental issues about the government’s role in 
addressing environmental risks. These more foundational issues 
are somewhat reflected in the case law. Long-established precedent 
provides that when government must choose which entities will 
suffer an unavoidable loss from a natural calamity, it does not 
incur takings liability to the loser.105 As the Court wrote in 
upholding a Virginia law requiring the destruction of infected 
cedar trees in order to save more valuable apple trees: “When 
forced to such a choice the [government] does not exceed its 
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class 
of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the 
legislature, is of greater value to the public.”106 Similarly, the 
courts have recognized an emergency exception to normal takings 
liability for government “destruction of ‘real and personal 
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a 
fire’ or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of 
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others.”107 These doctrines have somewhat stood on the fringes of 
regulatory takings doctrine because giving them full effect would 
come close to abolishing any normative foundation for regulatory 
takings generally. Sea-level rise may bring them to the center of 
consideration because government will be addressing a 
widespread, if slow-moving, calamity that will require choosing 
between where to flood and where to protect over a vast area. 
While it is too early to predict how courts will resolve this 
fundamental problem, it should sharpen the interest in how the 
Supreme Court conceptualizes takings by deliberate flooding.  
B. Soft Armoring  
Soft armoring, such as beach or wetlands restoration, harms 
environmental resources less than does hard armoring, because soft 
armoring aims to preserve or mimic natural landscape features and 
to preserve their ecological services. When successful, beach and 
dune replenishment can provide barriers against storm surges and 
rising seas, while engineered wetlands can also protect against 
storms while creating habitat and cleaning polluted waters.108 To 
be sure, such efforts are not always successful and thus pose 
greater environmental risks than retreat. Moreover, such efforts can 
be extremely expensive. Congress appropriated more than $100 
million each year between 1997 and 2005 for beach restoration.109 
The demand for beach renewal is likely to increase due to sea-level 
rise and associated storm-driven erosion. Yet, the public has shown 
a willingness to bear some costs for soft armoring to preserve 
recreational beaches. Also, private developers have engineered 
new wetlands as required mitigation for permits to fill and develop 
other wetlands.110   
Soft armoring presents different takings problems from hard 
armoring. It does not hold back walls of water and will not be 
breached intentionally to manage rising waters. Beach 
replenishment does raise questions about ownership of the newly 
constructed beach. Statutes authorizing beach renourishment, such 
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as the Florida statute considered below, understandably provide 
that the public owns the new beach that it has paid to create, but 
littoral owners may complain either that they should own the new 
beach or that their riparian rights related to contiguity to the water 
have been eliminated.  
The Supreme Court may have provided a roadmap for local 
governments to conduct beach restoration without takings liability 
in its unanimous decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection.111 In that case, 
the Court upheld a decision of the Florida Supreme Court, which 
had upheld a statutorily prescribed beach restoration initiative 
against takings challenges by littoral owners. The statute provided 
that a restored beach would be public property and that the 
boundary of the upland littoral owner would be fixed at an historic 
mean high-tide line rather than moved seaward to the new-shifting 
mean high-tide line.112 The upland owners argued in the state 
courts that the Act deprived them of the rights to future accretions 
and to have their land touch the water, but the Florida Supreme 
Court held that the upland owners did not have common law 
riparian rights of the dimension they claimed.113 The U.S. Supreme 
Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether the 
state court’s alleged change in common law property rules can 
effect a taking requiring the payment of just compensation.114 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the Florida Court’s 
decision because it considered the beach restoration to be an 
avulsion under state law (rather than an accretion), which did not 
move the boundary and which effectuated under common law a 
separation of the upland owner from contact with the water.115 
Accordingly, the statute did not work a taking because it mimicked 
the effect of the common law.  
Courts have taken Stop the Beach as a green light to sustain 
beach renourishment programs against takings claims.116 After all, 
such projects dump dredged sand on public trust sea bottoms, 
seaward of the tideline, so that no current private dry land is 
appropriated or even necessarily trespassed upon. States are 
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unlikely to fund beach reconstruction projects if the new beaches 
are constitutionally required to be privately owned.117 Furthermore, 
states are unlikely to fund beach restoration projects if states are 
forced to compensate private land owners when appropriating their 
land for public use. If courts can deem the construction “avulsion” 
rather than “accretion,” the upland owner’s common law rights are 
not at all impaired.  
Yet, the doctrine of avulsion seems a slim reed upon which to 
rest such large-scale public projects. Although ancient and 
ubiquitous, the avulsion–accretion distinction rests on weak 
normative grounds.118 It is difficult to understand why property 
rights should depend on the speed and perceptibility with which a 
water boundary recedes or encroaches. Moreover, the distinction 
seems quite susceptible to judicial interpretation to reach desired 
results post-hoc, as the degree of perceptibility necessary for 
finding avulsion cannot be stated with any precision. Indeed, it 
may be the best rationale for the distinction that its vagaries allow 
courts to accomplish substantial justice post-hoc.119  
Application of the common law doctrines of accretion and 
avulsion to beach reconstruction raises additional concerns, 
particularly in the era of sea-level rise. The traditional normative 
rationales for the doctrines of accretion and avulsion rest on the 
expectation that natural forces will unpredictably change water 
boundaries in both directions. Thus, accretion often is justified by 
the belief that a littoral or riparian owner will sometimes gain land 
and will sometimes lose land as lands erode or accrete. Blackstone 
wrote that “owners, being often losers by the breaking in of the 
sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a 
reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss.”120 
Similarly, sudden storms will sometimes perceptibly shift lands in 
either direction. But beach reconstructions are planned, financed, 
and engineered projects in which officials must take into account 
ex ante what effects their construction will have upon boundaries. 
Normative justifications for such projects should provide an 
overall assessment of their reasonableness and distributional 
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consequences rather than an invocation of obscure common law 
distinctions. Moreover, despite short-term fluctuations due to 
erosion and reliction, sea-level rise will move boundaries in only 
one direction: inland. The accretion rule must forfeit its traditional 
claim to fairness when boundaries no longer are as apt to move in 
one direction as in the other.121 
Courts’ consideration of regulatory takings claims for beach 
reconstruction may cling for a time to the mask of avulsion but 
over time needs to take a more comprehensive view of whether the 
effects on upland owners are the types of losses they should bear in 
all “fairness and justice.”122 Such renourishment, after all, protects 
the upland owner from erosion and from sea-level rise. No takings 
liability should attach to beach reconstruction so long as 
deprivation of upland owners’ rights is no greater than necessary to 
accomplish the project. The Florida Beach and Shore Preservation 
Act guarantees littoral owners that they will have access to the 
water, that no permanent structures will be erected on the new 
beach, and that the moving boundary line will resume if the state 
fails to maintain the reconstructed beach.123 As Justice Scalia 
stated at oral argument in Stop the Beach, “I’m not sure it’s a bad 
deal.”124 The Takings Clause should not require something other 
than that.  
C. Retreat  
The environmental and economic arguments for retreat before 
sea-level rise are compelling, at least for many coastal areas not 
intensely developed.125 As noted above, sea-level rise presents a 
problem primarily because of real estate development and 
predictable efforts to defend it. Preventing or removing 
development in the zone at risk for sea-level rise will reduce public 
costs of defending or responding to crises and will permit natural 
landscape features providing valuable ecological services to 
migrate landward. Different levels of stringency will be 
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appropriate for different areas, depending on their current and 
planned levels of development, their foreseeable proximity to 
rising waters, their suitability for hosting future ecological services 
as natural features seek to migrate, and other appropriate planning 
considerations.  
Most land-use regulations are devised and implemented by 
local governments pursuant to delegated state authority.126 Many 
states have created state-level agencies to plan and regulate land 
use near the coasts. The divisions of authority between localities 
and states in coastal areas can create complex problems of legal 
authority.127 Nonetheless, states and their localities have ample 
authority to implement regulations to address sea-level rise.128 
Land-use regulations can mandate or encourage retreat of 
development by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning new 
development or rebuilding.  
Efforts to enact such regulations will surely be resisted 
politically by those whose property or investments are harmed by 
them, as well as by local governments dependent on increased real 
estate taxes in the short term. Threats of takings liability will 
influence legislative decisions. Also, private property owners 
losing in the political process will likewise press regulatory takings 
claims. Part II.C considers existing law as it relates to various 
regulatory approaches to retreat and also discusses several means 
for governments seeking to effectuate retreat to avoid or limit 
takings liability. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is the touchstone for 
considering the regulatory takings consequences of retreat 
regulation.129 While that well-known and perennially controversial 
decision has been whittled down in direct application by 
subsequent decisions, it has shaped beachfront regulation in the 
face of sea-level rise. In Lucas, South Carolina’s Beachfront 
Management Act of 1988 attempted to implement a retreat strategy 
in response to past storm damage and studies of future sea-level 
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rise.130 One technique was scientifically sound but politically risky: 
it prohibited the construction of permanent structures seaward of a 
line drawn to reflect the most landward tidelines over the past 40 
years.131 As a result of this enactment, David Lucas found himself 
the owner of two undeveloped beachfront lots upon which no 
house could be built even though his lots were surrounded by 
large, expensive houses. A state trial court held that the statute 
effected a taking of Lucas’s property because he retained no 
economically viable use for the lots. The South Carolina Supreme 
Court never addressed this factual conclusion because it rejected 
Lucas’s takings claim on the ground that it was a reasonable 
environmental measure designed to protect the public from harm. 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the South Carolina Supreme 
Court’s legal reliance on the prevention of environmental harm and 
held that the Beachfront Management Act effected a taking per se 
because it left the owner with no economic value in the property.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Lucas has been 
analyzed many times from many perspectives. Certainly, it 
attempted to draw a line in the sand by stating that any restriction 
on use that leaves an owner with no economic value is the 
equivalent of expropriation without regard to its purpose or public 
benefits unless the restriction merely duplicated use restrictions 
already inherent in the title. This rule made bans on new 
construction constitutionally impracticable, regardless of the 
environmental benefits, unless some property law justification, 
such as nuisance law, could be found to restrict the owner’s normal 
development rights. Nuisance law has provided a very limited 
justification for regulations preventing environmental harm 
because it is premised on harm to identifiable property owners, 
whereas environmental harm injures widely diffused 
populations.132 Other harms from coastal development similarly 
injure the broader community, by increasing the costs of 
responding to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, and maintaining 
infrastructure worn down by wind and water.    
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On its face, Lucas presents a formidable barrier to land-use 
regulations implementing a retreat strategy because it mandates 
compensation for total prohibitions on development even if 
justified by the need to protect the shoreline ecology. Subsequent 
decisions more sympathetic to environmental regulation have 
focused both on limiting the scope of Lucas’s application and on 
expanding the scope of its exception for limitations that inhere in 
the owner’s title. First, the scope of Lucas has been confined 
largely to its facts, which depend upon the implausible but 
unchallenged trial court finding that the regulations deprived the 
owner’s lots of all of their economic value.133 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tahoe–Sierra made it clear that Lucas applies 
only to regulations that effect an 100% destruction in economic 
value.134 Thus, special subdivision or zoning regulations for shore 
areas that permit only very few clustered structures on large lots do 
not invoke Lucas and will be evaluated under the more contextual 
approach of Penn Central, where the economic loss to the property 
owner will be viewed in light of the public need for retreat.135  
Second, although nuisance law to date has contributed little to 
taming Lucas, the public trust doctrine has contributed more. As 
noted above, the public trust secures public ownership or (in some 
states) an easement over lands beneath navigable waters and 
tidelands. The public trust inheres in title to land.136 Accordingly, it 
defeats private owners’ regulatory takings claims against the 
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application of development regulations to projects within public 
trust areas.137 Moreover, it will move landward with the tideline.  
Thus, as the seas rise and the public trust areas move upland, the 
use rights of owners will either be extinguished or subjected to 
public property interests that will permit strict regulation without 
regard to Lucas. Note that when the public trust applies, the private 
owner is not just relegated to Penn Central but has no takings 
claim at all because the public enjoys a superior property interest.  
The contours of the public trust doctrine are vague, and some 
courts have substantially expanded the resources to which it 
applies, as well as the public uses and values that it protects.138 A 
key question is whether the proximity of private land upland to 
public trust land and its anticipated conversion by accretion 
enhances regulatory authority under the Takings Clause. In other 
words, does the fact that a regulation seeks to restrict private land 
in order to protect nearby or future public land limit the private 
owner’s right so that such restrictions would not be held to be 
regulatory takings although they would be in another landscape?139 
On one hand, courts are unlikely to extend full public trust rights to 
new categories of uplands now privately owned because doing so 
would largely displace most private rights. Unless the court finds 
that the public trust inheres in the private owner’s title, it cannot 
save a regulation that otherwise falls within the Lucas category. On 
the other hand, the arguments that regulation of private land 
protects nearby public trust resources and that those private lands 
likely will become public through accretion in the foreseeable 
future must be powerful factors to consider under a Penn Central 
analysis. These considerations add protection of the public’s 
ownership interests to police power protection of public health, 
safety, and welfare.  
Another approach to accomplishing retreat is a prohibition 
against armoring portions of the coastline.140 This Article has 
already considered land-use regulations that directly prohibit or 
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restrict development in coastal areas. Prohibitions on building 
bulkheads and other engineering defenses against sea-level rise 
also implement a retreat strategy because without armoring, rising 
waters and storm erosion will eventually compel owners to retreat 
as properties become inundated or unsafe. Such prohibitions also 
address harms that armoring can impose on natural shorelines by 
exacerbating lateral erosion or by eliminating the intertidal area.  
A number of states already prohibit armoring on the 
oceanfront, and so far these have survived takings challenges. For 
example, North Carolina’s state-level regulation prohibiting 
construction of hardened structures for erosion control on the 
state’s beaches was upheld.141 Such a result makes sense. 
Armoring prohibitions generally do not deprive the owner of all 
economically valuable use so long as the threat of erosion or 
inundation remains in the future. Current use of previously 
developed land is preserved. Thus, except in exigent 
circumstances, the regulation should be analyzed under Penn 
Central, where the importance of accommodating natural shoreline 
changes and the harm to other shore lands can be considered. 
Moreover, future losses to the owner will be accomplished by 
nature, not by government; the owner is prohibited only from 
taking defensive measures that have adverse effects on neighbors, 
on the environment, and on public trust resources.142  
This orthodox analysis is threatened to some extent by the 
Supreme Court’s flirtation with the alternative standard, which 
looks to determine if a statute or court decision has eliminated an 
established property right. The plurality opinion in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment embraced this test for so-called judicial takings. 
The plurality stated that any judicial change in common law 
property rules that eliminated an established right constitutes a 
taking.143 Some prior decisions tend toward adopting this same 
approach without much discussion.144  
                                                                                                             
 141. See Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 142. In United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), the court held 
that an ordinance prohibiting seawalls did not effect a taking, noting that it 
protected tribal rights in tidelands. 
 143. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (“If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an 
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, 
no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by 
regulation.”). 
 144. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998) (holding 
that interest payments upon a deposit must be assigned to the owner of the 
principal). 
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Adherence to such an approach would essentially prevent 
legislatures in some states from prohibiting armoring without 
compensation to owners. Under the common law “common enemy 
rule” followed with various refinements in some states, a land 
owner can take any steps required to fend off casual waters, 
including flood waters, without regard to the damage to others.145 
In such a state, a statutory prohibition on armoring would deprive 
an owner of a common law right. Thus, a full-blooded application 
of the plurality from Stop the Beach would appear to constitute a 
taking because it eliminates an established common law right.146 
Other states follow a “reasonable use rule” under which 
landowners who divert floodwaters will not be liable unless the 
resulting interference with another’s land is unreasonable. In such 
states, the statutory prohibition on armoring could be found a 
taking unless the court concludes that the statute fits within the 
common law rule by protecting other landowners, including public 
trust lands. 
Such outcomes highlight the radical nature of the common law 
essentialism that the plurality in Stop the Beach embraced.147 
Statutes are adopted to change common law rules in light of 
experience and political judgment, but this approach makes the 
State compensate loser property owners when making changes 
deemed to eliminate established property rights. Such an approach 
excessively canonizes the status quo and creates a bulwark against 
experiment and reform. Moreover, it goes against Supreme Court 
precedent. For example, a virtually unanimous Court upheld a 
statutory prohibition on sale of eagle parts, stating, “[T]he denial of 
one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. 
At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property 
rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, 
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”148 The Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that it looks at the property as whole, 
                                                                                                             
 145. See generally Davis, supra note 83 (describing the different approaches 
among the states to diffused surface water).  
 146. Under the Stop the Beach plurality’s approach, classic state common 
law decisions changing from the common enemy to the reasonable use 
approach, such as Wisconsin v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974), and Tucker 
v. Badoian, 384 N.E. 2d 1195 (Mass. 1978), constitute judicial takings because 
they deprive one owner of an established property right to divert water without 
liability. And eventually, someone will argue that such a change in the common 
law is not just a taking but is constitutionally invalid because it takes a right 
from A and gives it to B and therefore lacks a public use.  
 147. See Byrne, supra note 114. 
 148. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).  
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weighing the facts of the case to determine whether fairness 
requires that the owner be compensated.149  
Prohibitions on armoring may crystallize divergent paths in the 
development of regulatory takings doctrine. The pathway of 
common law essentialism would make efforts to adapt to climate 
change dependent on adhering to common law doctrines adopted 
without regard to modern science or environmental conditions, 
potentially hamstringing innovations.150 Moreover, the common 
law rules implicated by sea-level rise contain a myriad of obscure 
rights for littoral owners, such as rights of unobstructed view, 
categorical constitutional protection of which would severely 
constrain regulators. The other pragmatic path, while hardly 
unproblematic, does reserve constitutional compensation for 
property owners unfairly burdened by large losses not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of their investment.  
There is yet another, more obscure branch of regulatory takings 
doctrine that may constrain an otherwise rational retreat strategy.  
A long-standing, if vague and under-theorized, body of law 
provides that government’s failure to maintain public access can 
effectuate a taking of the marooned property.151 Thus, a decision 
not to rebuild roads or bridges threatened by rising seas or more 
severe or more frequent storms can trigger a constitutional duty to 
compensate owners losing access to the public road system.152 The 
paucity of decisions, mostly in lower state courts, and the brief, 
precedent-minded opinions make it difficult to predict how 
vigorous a constraint this might be for a locality facing mounting 
costs for damaged or threatened infrastructure.  
The problem can be observed by considering a decision of a 
Florida state court of appeals.153 In Jordan v. St. Johns County, 
property owners on a barrier island alleged an inverse 
condemnation because St. Johns County, Florida, had intentionally 
failed to maintain the sole access road, which was “subject to 
repeated damage from natural forces such as storms and 
                                                                                                             
 149. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 497–99 (1987).  
 150. See Byrne, supra note 59.  
 151. See William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the 
Power of Eminent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733 (1969).  
 152. See David A. Lewis, Constitutional Property Law Analysis of State and 
Local Government Disinvestment in Infrastructure as a Coastal Adaptation 
Strategy (2012) (unpublished student paper) (on file with author); Travis Martay 
Brennan, Redefining the American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw 
Basic Services From the Coast and Avoid Takings Claims?, 14 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 101 (2008).  
 153. Jordan v. St. Johns Cnty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
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erosion.”154 The appeals court reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the County, ruling that a “governmental 
entity has a duty to reasonably maintain its public roads.”155 
Moreover, the failure of the government to act in the face of this 
duty “can support a claim for inverse condemnation.”156 The court 
relied on prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court dealing with 
road reconstruction eliminating access to the public highway. 
“There is a right to be compensated through inverse condemnation 
when governmental action causes a substantial loss of access to 
one’s property even though there is no physical appropriation of 
the property itself.”157 
Such an approach, if courts vigorously pursue it, could severely 
hamstring reasonable government planning for retreat, even in the 
absence of regulation of private property uses.158 This judicially-
created doctrine may have made sense in light of an owner’s 
normal reliance on public access for his or her land and concerns 
about government discrimination, but such rationale is greatly 
diminished in the shadow of sea-level rise. Plainly, government 
must discontinue providing access to parcels rendered 
uninhabitable by water. Nor should government be expected to 
fund rehabilitation of public ways at unlimited expense to elevate 
roads above wet land. Those points being granted, a court should 
defer to government’s reasonable judgments that sea-level rise has 
rendered maintenance of a public roadway unsafe or economically 
imprudent. Judge-made doctrines to protect property owners under 
normal conditions should not be extended to provide inflexible 
protections under changed environmental conditions.  
III. THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION 
A characteristic of our property law is its accommodation of 
changes in ownership and ownership rights over time. In 
particular, it allows legal measures presently enacted or granted to 
change rights in the future. The system of estates in land and future 
interests that English common law created has pioneered 
                                                                                                             
 154. Id. at 837. 
 155. Id. at 839.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. (quoting Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 
1989)).  
 158. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act prohibits the federal government 
from providing federal funds for constructing roads, docks, or new infrastructure 
on undeveloped barrier islands. 16 U.S.C. § 3504 (2006). Its prospective 
character insulates it from the removal of public access doctrine discussed in the 
text.  
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astounding flexibility in dividing ownership rights over time, both 
conditioning rights of possession or disposition and cutting them 
off. As previously noted, sea-level rise also raises perplexing 
issues of time, as society regulates land use to cope with natural 
forces that will impose increasing threats and eventually submerge 
private property. In Part II, this Article outlined several of the 
takings-related problems inherent in various forms of adaption 
land-use regulation. This Part considers the advantages that time 
provides to a government seeking to implement a retreat strategy 
through land-use regulations. This Part presents four approaches 
that employ time as a feature of dynamic regulation, which will 
avoid or minimize takings liability. Such legal measures enact 
regulations or take other legal actions now that will have effects 
primarily in the future.  
As a preliminary matter, time has become a familiar element of 
land-use regulatory systems. Early zoning systems employed 
largely static approaches, under which regulation presupposed 
unchanging rules enacted at a single moment.159 But growth 
control regulation began in the 1960s and employed dynamic 
models under which the permissibility of certain uses was set to 
change over time according to changing conditions or findings.160 
Courts largely upheld such innovations, and phased development 
regulations have become uncontroversial. Moreover, the core of 
urban land-use regulation has become site-specific legislative 
changes in zoning, often negotiated with the owner and 
accompanied by exactions to mitigate the effects or public costs of 
new development.161 Even more pertinent to adaptation to climate 
change, many statutes, such as the federal Endangered Species Act 
and local historic preservation ordinances, extend new regulatory 
controls on private property as a result of new administrative 
findings, themselves often reflecting changed ecological conditions 
or the passage of time.162 In short, employing time as a dynamic 
factor in addressing a changing natural condition seems fitting and 
right.  
                                                                                                             
 159. For the classic example of zoning considered as one-time regulation 
based on end state planning, see Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365 (1926).  
 160. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 
(N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).   
 161. See generally Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining 
Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical 
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987).  
 162. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (listing a species as endangered or 
threatened), with D.C. CODE §6-1103(c)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (process for 
designating a historic landmark or historic district).  
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This Part focuses on using time in support of retreat regulations 
because retreat measures raise the most opposition from property 
owners as well as takings issues because in many circumstances 
retreat is the most cost-effective and environmentally beneficial 
approach. Furthermore, retreat is most easily calibrated to the 
passage of time. Retreat prohibits new construction in whole or in 
part, as well as reconstruction in sensitive areas. Yet it need not do 
so immediately. Moreover, some areas that may be regulated now 
will become publicly owned as waters rise. In general, sea-level 
rise would not present environmental problems if the coasts were 
not so heavily and ubiquitously developed because natural features 
and environmental services would simply move inland. The 
problem retreat addresses is how to allow these natural forces to 
operate given existing development and incentives.  
Below, this Part presents and discusses four retreat measures 
that state or local land-use regulators may take in the near future to 
address sea-level rise before the its effects are felt in their entirety. 
To an extent, these measures seek to change regulations as needed 
over time so that private owners and the public can share use 
benefits. The goal is to allow owners to benefit while they may but 
also to effectively address the compelling needs to withdraw 
development from the advancing shoreline and permit valuable 
ecosystems to establish themselves in new inland locations.  
Such efforts may also help shape landowners’ future 
expectations, both allowing them to adapt economically and 
reducing the likelihood that courts will find regulations’ 
application to them to constitute takings. In general, widespread 
discussion about the challenges of sea-level rise and long term 
planning to adapt to it helps government, property owners, and the 
public generally to understand and adjust to the changes it 
demands. One prominent understanding of the regulatory takings 
doctrine is that it protects property owners who bear 
disproportionate or unanticipated transition costs from changes in 
property law.163 That perspective is prominent within the Penn 
Central approach, which puts at its core the frustration of 
reasonable “investment-backed expectations.”164 Within that 
understanding, embedding future restrictions in law or plans 
lessens surprise and permits owners to adjust or hedge against 
                                                                                                             
 163. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 
(1967).  
 164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
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those future changes, lessening the losses to them and reducing the 
likelihood that a court subsequently will find a taking.165  
A. Moratorium  
A moratorium temporarily prohibits new development until a 
planning inquiry can be conducted and a zoning regulation 
adopted. Moratoria are familiar if not frequent parts of the land-use 
planning process. The U.S. Supreme Court has written that “the 
consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, 
or ‘interim development controls’ as they are often called, are an 
essential tool of successful development.”166 A moratorium has the 
virtue of creating time for a study of a problem or area before 
allowing long-lasting development to proceed. It also creates 
horizontal equity among potential owners contemplating 
development by denying an advantage to those who can quickly 
build before new regulations are adopted and by subjecting all to 
the same delay and new regulations.  
A moratorium on armoring or on new development near the sea 
may make sense for some jurisdictions. Public consciousness about 
sea-level rise has only just begun, and a planning process can 
educate citizens about risks and alternatives. New studies about the 
pace of sea-level rise and its practical consequences seem to be 
published daily. Similarly, information about alternatives to hard 
armoring may enable owners to understand how to protect their 
property without environmental harm.167 A moratorium could 
create breathing space for such planning and debate, especially if 
large-scale developments have been proposed that would change 
the shoreline before informed decisions could be made. Moratoria 
are more transparent and evenhanded than their near alternative, 
                                                                                                             
 165. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 
F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting takings claim where owner subdivided in 
anticipation of designation as historic landmark).    
 166. Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 337–38 (2002). 
 167. Connecticut recently enacted new legislation that minimizes the use of 
hard armoring in favor of enhancing natural barriers to sea-level rise (i.e., soft 
armoring) and placing new structures further from the shoreline. A Republican 
legislator and shore front property owner, who initially supported a bill more 
single-mindedly protective of property rights, remarked about the “living 
shoreline” techniques embraced by the enacted statute: “This opens it up to 
whole new ways to protect the shoreline; it's kind of cool. . . . I’m definitely 
going to take a look at it.” Jan Ellen Siegel, Coastal Management Legislation 
Balances Environmental Concerns with Property Rights, CTMIRROR.ORG (May 
9, 2012), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16289/coastal-management-legislation-
balances-environmental-concerns-property-rights.  
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informal administrative delay in granting permits until planning is 
completed.  
A moratorium is not a per se temporary taking, even if it 
prohibits all development on a property for a period of time. The 
Supreme Court rejected such a contention in the Tahoe–Sierra 
case, where the Court held that a moratorium on development 
could not be considered a Lucas total taking for the period of the 
moratorium.168 Such claims must be adjudicated under the Penn 
Central standards, by which any diminution in value to the 
property had to be measured against the value of the entire fee 
simple property interest. The Court noted that many properties will 
not decline in market value at all if development is postponed by a 
moratorium.169 The Court emphasized that a moratorium would not 
countenance a “temporal severance,” that is, evaluating the effects 
of a regulation only for the period of time in which it is in effect 
rather than in regard to the entire temporal span of the underlying 
ownership interest. A fee simple ownership interest is one of 
potentially infinite duration.170  
Moratoria are generally, but not universally, permitted under 
state law. The key issues for courts turn on whether the 
moratorium was adopted in good faith for a valid planning purpose 
and whether the duration is reasonable in light of its purpose.171 A 
moratorium adopted to plan for new land-use regulations for 
coastal properties should be found to have a valid purpose, given 
the challenge and the need to consider new forms of regulation. 
The problem may be how long such a moratorium may last. The 
complexities of sea-level rise will not presently be solved in any 
final way. But if a jurisdiction engages in a planning process with a 
definite goal and timeframe, a moratorium for that period should 
be held reasonable. The moratorium that survived takings review 
in Tahoe–Sierra lasted six years, not an unreasonable time given 
the complex task of figuring out how to permit residential 
development while also safeguarding the clarity of Lake Tahoe 
from runoff.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 168. Tahoe–Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.  
 169. Id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless 
by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover 
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”). 
 170. Id.   
 171. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 495–98 (2d ed. 2007). 
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B. Rolling Development Restrictions 
Rolling development restrictions were one of the first 
innovative regulatory tools proposed for addressing sea-level rise. 
Rolling development restrictions are special zoning rules severely 
restricting new development or redevelopment on land near the 
shore. Their defining feature is that the development restrictions 
move landward, or “roll,” as the tide line moves landward.172 Thus, 
just as sea-level rise pushes the boundary between public trust 
tidelands and private uplands landward through accretion, the 
adjacent regulatory zone moves landward in front of the tideline. 
Instead of transferring title to the public, as the public trust 
doctrine does, the rolling development restriction makes applicable 
to land the special restrictions needed to adapt to sea-level rise as 
the seas draw nearer. Rolling development restrictions embody the 
concept of retreat, increasingly restricting development as the seas 
rise.  
Rolling development restrictions offer property owners some 
substantial benefits, at least as compared with other forms of strict 
land-use regulation. First, they impose no regulations tailored to 
sea-level rise before they are needed, preserving to the owner use 
and development rights in the meantime. This may be especially 
important given the lack of certainty as to the pace of sea-level rise 
because rolling development restrictions would preserve the 
owners’ rights until the seas actually begin to threaten their 
property. Second, despite the uncertainty concerning timing, 
rolling restrictions give owners certainty as to the effects of sea-
level rise, allowing them to arrange their plans accordingly. The 
rolling feature also ties the restriction closely to the problem being 
addressed, making it more difficult for regulators to pursue 
alternative or hidden agendas in beachfront regulation.  
The rolling feature, of course, helps retreat regulations pass 
regulatory takings review. Rolling regulations avoid the Lucas rule 
because they permit development and use now, which should have 
substantial economic value. Given the Tahoe–Sierra Court’s 
rejection of temporal severance, the owner cannot suffer a 100% 
diminution in value, however strict future development restrictions 
may be. A court reviewing a rolling development restriction must 
                                                                                                             
 172. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 10. The clearest example of a rolling 
development restriction is Maine’s Sand Dunes Rules, which provide that “[a] 
project may not be permitted if, within 100 years, the property may reasonably 
be expected to be eroded as a result of changes in the shoreline such that the 
project is likely to be severely damaged after allowing for a two foot rise in sea 
level over 100 years.” 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355, § 5 (Westlaw 2012).  
110 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
consider its effect on the whole property for its full duration. For 
example, a beach house that will eventually become subject even 
to an extremely strict rolling regulation that would require the 
house to be abandoned would still have a substantial current-
economic value based on the estimate of when sea-level rise would 
push the restrictive zone upon it. The key to this analysis is that the 
regulation applies immediately but restricts the property only when 
necessary to achieve the public purpose. Of course, many such 
private properties will become fully public when the tides cover 
them.  
James Titus, at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
developed rolling development restrictions and termed the 
regulatory instrument a “rolling easement,” invoking the easement 
protected under the Texas Open Beaches Act.173 That Act protects 
public easements of access on Texas beaches landward of the mean 
high tideline created by prescription or custom; public trust 
tidelands lie seaward of that tideline.174 Texas courts long 
interpreted public beach easements to roll landward with the 
tideline due to erosion or storms. Landowners upon whose land the 
easement rolled were required to demolish any structures that 
materially interfered with public access. The Texas courts 
repeatedly held that the rolling of the easement did not take any 
legal rights from the owner because the private land already had 
been subject to the easement and the possibility of its rolling.175 
Titus imaginatively saw this structure as providing an appropriate 
template for land-use regulations implementing a retreat strategy.  
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Severance v. Patterson 
threw the template into doubt.176 That case has a tortuous and 
bizarre procedural history, which need not be considered here. The 
sharply divided court held that a Texas beach easement does not 
roll without effecting a taking of an upland home, at least when the 
coastline moves rapidly in an avulsive event. The court’s final 
opinion, although thoughtful, can be criticized on several grounds. 
But for present purposes, it must be emphasized that its takings 
analysis applies only to avulsion and to public access easements 
and not to rolling use restrictions tied to sea-level rise.  
                                                                                                             
 173. Titus, supra note 11, at 1313.  
 174. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011–61.026 (West 2011).  
 175. See Arrington v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 38 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 
2001); Feinman v. Texas, 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App. 1986); Moody v. White, 
593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 
App. 1986). 
 176. 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012).  
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First, the court made it clear that even public access easements 
can move by accretion without provoking a taking. The court 
explained: 
Although existing public easements in the dry beach of 
Galveston’s West Beach are dynamic, as natural forces 
cause the vegetation and the mean high tide lines to move 
gradually and imperceptibly, these easements do not spring 
or roll landward to encumber other parts of the parcel or 
new parcels as a result of avulsive events.177  
However insubstantial may be the distinction between accretion 
and avulsion, sea-level rise, compared with erosion from a 
hurricane, does move gradually and imperceptibly.  
Second, and more fundamentally, the Severance court, 
following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, drew a sharp distinction 
between laws that authorize public access and those that regulate 
use. The former are always takings, while the latter are generally 
permissible unless they go “too far.”178 The court explicitly 
rejected an argument that “blurs the line between ownership and 
right to use of a portion of a parcel.”179 A statutory regulation, 
unlike a common law easement, can apply to land before the 
conditions that trigger different restrictions come into force. 
Moreover, there seems no reason why a statute creating rolling 
development restrictions cannot condition the rolling on sea-level 
rise without regard to the accretion–avulsion distinction. Because a 
development restriction is not a taking per se, it need not so closely 
adhere to rules for transferring ownership.  
Thus, rolling development restrictions remain a viable and 
imaginative regulatory tool for implementing a retreat strategy. 
They preserve unimpeded current use to the private owner while 
immediately imposing a legal burden on the property that in the 
future will significantly restrict use rights. They neither authorize 
public access nor completely eliminate all economic value, so they 
are not takings per se. Considered under Penn Central, they 
preserve substantial economic value while shaping the owner’s 
expectations long before significant limitations on use become 
enforceable. While not every rolling development restriction will 
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. at 372. 
 178. See Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002); Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 725 (“To say that the 
appropriation of a public easement across a landowner’s premises does not 
constitute the taking of a property interest but rather . . . ‘a mere restriction on its 
use,’ . . . is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary 
meaning.” (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)).  
 179. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 726. 
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survive regulatory takings review under current law, most drafted 
with an eye to Penn Central should. Such temporally flexible 
instruments make a virtue of the challenge inherent in sea-level 
rise—that we must carefully plan now for risks that will only 
materialize in the uncertain future.  
C. Exactions 
Some regulations implementing retreat will be at high risk of 
being held to be takings. States have different common law 
traditions, different judicial politics, and some have different state 
constitutional takings doctrines. Moreover, the federal 
constitutional takings doctrine has been subject to ebbs and flows, 
so regulations that might have been held takings in one decade 
might not have been have been in another. Future presidential 
elections will have more influence on constitutional property rights 
development than will logic.  
One area of regulatory takings law that has remained stable for 
some time is exactions. This refers to the now very familiar 
practice of land-use regulators granting permits for development 
upon the condition that the owner convey some interest in property 
to the public in order to mitigate public harms or costs from the 
development. The public can obtain interests through exactions 
that would violate the Takings Clause if directly appropriated. 
Thus, government can require a property owner to convey a public 
easement as a proper condition to the granting of a construction 
permit, even if an ordinance simply mandating such access would 
constitute a taking per se. The Supreme Court has adjudicated 
uniform constitutional standards for such exactions. First, the 
interest exacted must have a “logical nexus” with a legitimate 
public purpose. Second, the interest exacted must be “roughly 
proportionate” to the impact of the development.180  
Land-use regulators should be able to use exactions to 
implement severe use restrictions that could not be legislated 
directly without incurring takings liability. For example, consider 
prohibitions on armoring. This Article argued above that such 
prohibitions normally should not be considered takings. But in a 
state that recognized a strong common law right to armor, it might 
be held to be a taking because it eliminates an established common 
law right. But in many cases, the concern about bulkheads is 
directed at future, not present, sea-level rise. Thus, if an owner 
seeks a permit to develop a lot that may be threatened by rising 
waters in the foreseeable future but is not now, the government can 
                                                                                                             
 180. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. 
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grant the development permit on the condition that no future 
armoring will be permitted. Indeed, imposing such conditions is 
now a consistent policy of the California Coastal Commission.181 
By hypothesis, the owner has no immediate need to armor the 
shore and can enjoy full use of the property for some period 
without such construction. Such a condition plainly and logically 
advances important policies protecting the natural shore and 
neighboring landowners. It is quite proportionate to those harms 
because it seeks not to prevent beneficial use now, but only when 
the harm will crystalize. Like rolling development restrictions, it 
divides use rights in time between the private owner and the 
public.  
Many stringent regulatory policies can be implemented through 
exactions that could not be legislated directly. In addition to 
prohibitions on armoring, government might impose conditions 
that prohibit rebuilding after destruction from a storm, or obtain 
conservation easements where current wetlands may survive or 
where future wetlands or dunes may form. Of course, exactions 
work only in the context of granting development permits. That 
sea-level rise is a known risk that will materialize in the future 
invites legal instruments that are implemented now but have public 
value later as seas rise.  
D. Eminent Domain of Future Interests 
There will be properties of which government will need to take 
ownership in order to effectively manage retreat. These may be 
lands that will require active management for current or future 
habitat for species displaced by sea-level rise or other 
consequences of climate change. Also, some areas will need to be 
held open so that natural costal features, such as wetlands or dunes, 
can reconstitute themselves or be constructed there. Finally, 
government will need to obtain some areas to constitute 
infrastructure, such as roads, that the sea will destroy. Some of 
these lands will simply need to be purchased, either consensually 
or through condemnation. Of course, government need not 
purchase lands that will be inundated because the rules of accretion 
will subject them to the public trust without any need for legal 
action. But the preservation of valuable environmental services and 
public functions will require the acquisition of dry land not subject 
to the public trust.  
Land purchase poses the serious problem of financing 
payment. Outright purchase of large parcels adequate to meet 
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probable environmental needs will cost a great deal of money, 
especially in light of the many other financial needs that sea-level 
rise will impose on public authorities. Moreover, the public will 
need areas meeting specific criteria—land to serve as wetlands or 
to otherwise provide environmental services eliminated by rising 
seas. Thus, owners of suitable land will possess situational 
monopolies that will necessitate the use of the power of eminent 
domain.182 That presents additional obstacles. Eminent domain is 
exceedingly unpopular and, therefore, generally avoided by elected 
officials.183 The Fifth Amendment, of course, requires 
compensation to be paid at full market value.184   
The temporal dimension provides a partial solution here, as 
well. Government can use eminent domain to condemn future 
interests rather than full titles or fee simples. Government needs to 
take possession of most of the properties at issue only in the future, 
although it might well need to know that it will be able to take 
possession of them as sea-level rise progresses. Thus, the 
condemnation of future interests will provide assurance of future 
public possession of special sites. The present market value of a 
future interest will be a fraction of the present value of the full fee 
simple interest. The longer in the future the right of possession of 
the future interest holder is projected, the lower the present value 
will be. At the same time, condemnation of future interests does 
not intrude as much into the interests of the private owners, who 
can continue to use the property beneficially for the time being,  
perhaps for as long as his or her life.  Thus, condemnation of future 
interests presents a surprising win–win outcome, as compared with 
immediate or future condemnation of full title.  
There seems to be no reason why government cannot condemn 
future interests in real property. Even though no judicial decision 
has addressed the question, there seems every reason to believe 
that such a power would be upheld. Nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits it. Statutory authorizations clearly empower both the 
United States and New York to take all kinds of property interests 
by eminent domain. The Supreme Court wrote long ago: “The 
taking by condemnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar 
in the law of eminent domain. Where formal proceedings are 
initiated by the party condemning, it is usual and proper to specify 
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the precise interest taken, where less than the fee.”185 One 
commentator has stated: “Future interests are clearly subject to 
being taken under the power of eminent domain, since the power 
has been generally held to extend to every type of interest, estate, 
possession, or expectancy.”186 Moreover, the federal government 
has used a functional equivalent for more than 40 years without 
serious challenge: taking an entire interest in land but permitting 
the owner a “reservation of use and occupancy” for life or for a 
number of years.  
The power of eminent domain is inherent in government. The 
Fifth Amendment restricts this power only in requiring that it be 
exercised for a “public use” and that the owner receive “just 
compensation.” Taking land for conservation purposes is doubtless 
a “public use.”187 Questions concerning which land or how large 
an interest should be taken for a public purpose lie within 
legislative discretion.188 Although taking a future interest implies 
that government needs only to make a future use of the land, that 
should not eliminate the public use because a present taking for 
future needs is permissible. The Supreme Court itself stated: “In 
determining whether the taking of property is necessary for public 
use not only the present demands of the public, but those which 
may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered.”189 
Moreover, the taking of only a future interest would counter any 
concern that the government would be guilty of “excess 
condemnation” that might not constitute a public use190 because 
government would be limiting displacement of private owners to 
the foreseeable future when the land would be required to cope 
with sea-level rise.  
State exercises of eminent domain are governed by state 
statutes. These generally do not limit the types of property interests 
the state may condemn. New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure 
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Law, for example, broadly defines the “real property” that can be 
condemned to include: 
[A]ll land and improvements, lands under water, waterfront 
property, the water of any lake, pond or stream, all 
easements and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, and 
every estate, interest and right, legal or equitable, in lands 
or water, and right, interest, privilege, easement and 
franchise relating to the same, including terms for years and 
liens by way of mortgage or otherwise.191  
This language plainly includes future interests. The government’s 
authority to take easements rather than full title is well 
established.192 Indeed, courts have sometimes created a 
presumption that condemnation of a right of way transfers only an 
easement rather than a fee interest in the transportation corridor.193 
Government can also condemn temporary interests in land and 
leaseholds, when it suits public needs.194  
The National Park Service (NPS) has been using condemnation 
to take the equivalent of future interests for many years. The Cape 
Cod National Seashore Act, for example, provides that when the 
Service seeks to condemn “improved property,” essentially a 
single-family home and lot, the owner may “elect” to retain “the 
right of use and possession” for up to a 25-year term or for the 
owners’ lives.195 When the private owner elects to retain a life 
estate or term of years, NPS obtains a future interest analogous to a 
reversion. Current NPS policy also generally provides for similar 
reservations in owners of condemned lands. NPS Director’s Order 
number 25, section 11.3, authorizes NPS to “allow a reservation of 
use and occupancy of property improved with a residence.”196 
Thus, while some statutes require NPS to offer reservations at 
some sites, NPS may do so at any of its sites.197 Under this 
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approach, NPS can condemn property but allow the owner to retain 
possession and use for either up to a 25-year term or a “life estate.” 
These reservations are a “deeded interest,” meaning that after 
conveyance they amount to property rights that may not be 
abrogated except as provided in the statute. Neither can they be 
extended. The only substantive difference between such 
reservations and this Article’s proposal for condemning future 
interests is that under the NPS approach the owner must agree to 
accept the reservation. Also, in this Article’s proposal, the vesting 
of the government in possession would occur as the seas rise.  
Condemnation of future interests in lands identified as having 
significance for adaptation to sea-level rise will not only give the 
government full ownership of the land in the future, but it will also 
enhance regulatory authority immediately. As a future interest 
holder, government would have the right to bring an action against 
those currently in possession for “waste,” that is, to prevent current 
changes in use that would cause unreasonable or excessive harm to 
the reversionary interest.198 Government rights against waste may 
permit the government to prohibit some actions that a court might 
otherwise find to be a taking, such as habitat destruction or 
construction of a seawall. Such a right would inhere in the title to 
the property and thus would be included within the exception to 
the Lucas rule.199  
The question of how much compensation the government 
would save by condemning only a future interest would depend 
primarily on how far in the future the government plans to take 
possession of the property. This depends on the events used to 
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trigger that right. Generally, just compensation means that 
government must pay fair market value: what a willing buyer 
would pay a willing seller.200 Although no case concerning 
condemnation of a naked future interest could be found, there is 
established law about how to value a future interest when the 
government condemns land that already is subject to a future 
interest; in such a case, compensation must be divided between the 
present and future interest holders.201 To determine the value of the 
government’s future interest, one could deduct the value of the 
present possessory estate from the appraised value of the land. 
This, of course, requires some estimate of how long the present 
possessory estate will endure, something analogous to the use of 
actuarial estimates for the duration of life estates. Alternatively, 
one could calculate the discounted present value of the right to 
possess full title to the land at termination of the present 
possessory estate. This amounts to the current value of full title to 
the land discounted for the expected time until the seas rise or 
other conditions are met. This equals the amount of money that, 
invested now at prevailing interest rates, will equal the dollar value 
of the fee simple interest in the land at the time the government 
expects to gain full ownership. The discount rate would be based 
upon prevailing interest rates because it essentially measures the 
time value of money. Despite current historically low interest rates, 
this would save substantial money for events projected into the 
latter years of this century.  
CONCLUSION 
Property law sets boundaries between the individual and 
society. Unprecedented changes in the natural world must change 
the calculation of what society can require of individual property 
owners. Sea-level rise changes the extent to which a private owner 
can develop land at the coast and armor the coastline. Such legal 
reforms will be made differently in different states and in 
communities with different property traditions, regulatory 
structures, and environmental conditions. Constitutional property 
rights, enforced through the regulatory takings doctrine should be, 
at most, a loose constraint on how states seek to reform land-use 
regulation to protect public safety and the environmental services 
upon which humans collectively rely.  
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